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Both the United States and Australia are currently involved in the seem-
ingly endless process of income tax reform. While the United States tax
reform process seems to lack both the intensity and pace of the
Australian tax reform, the United States process may still result in
substantial change. This paper will consider the current United States
income tax structure including tax legislation changes occurring in the
1980s. It will then consider various types of proposals to alter the income
tax system. Finally, it will deal principally with the income tax reform
proposals made by the Reagan administration which may result in tax
legislation in 1986.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CURRENT UNITED
STATES TAX SYSTEM
The structure of the United States income tax system is almost identical
to the structure of the system in Australia. It begins by including within
the tax base all items of gross income, a concept which is comparable to
the Australian concept of assessable income. A major difference is that
the scope of United States gross income is broader than Australia's
assessable income. This has been so in the past because capital gains have
been included within gross income albeit subject to preferential treat-
ment, and it continues to be so because of inclusion of various types of
windfall gains such as prizes, awards, and gambling winnings. Like
Australia, the United States then allows various deductions from gross
income in arriving at taxable income. The scope of those deductions
includes not only a broad range of business deductions but also
numerous personal deductions for such things as interest, charitable
contributions, extraordinary medical expenses, and most state and local
taxes. The third step under both systems is to impose tax at progressive
Stephen A. Lind is a Professor of Law at the Hastings College of Law, University of
California and the Holland Law Centre, University of Florida.
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rates on taxable income. Noncorporate taxpayers in the United States are
taxed under a rate schedule that contains 14 brackets and which has a
maximum tax rate of 50 per cent.' Corporate taxpayers are subject to
fewer brackets and their maximum tax rate is 46 per cent.' Only 40 per
cent of noncorporate capital gains are included in gross income, resulting
in a maximum 20 per cent tax rate,I while corporate capital gains are taxed
at a maximum 28 per cent rate.' In determining actual tax due the United
States system then allows 'credits' which directly reduce the amount of
tax liability. They are similar to Australian rebates. Credits are allowed
for prepaid taxes as a result of withholding and as well for various types
of personal and business expenses. The most important non-withholding
credit under the United States system is the investment credit, which is a
credit of a maximum 10 per cent of the cost of investment in tangible,
depreciable personal property.' Finally, the United States income tax
system has a concept not present under the Australian system. Introduced
in the late 1960s, it is known as the Minimum Tax. The Minimum Tax
for noncorporate taxpayers is essentially an alternative tax to the tax
computed under the regular system described above, and it is imposed at
a 20 per cent rate. The corporate Minimum Tax is an add-on tax in
addition to the regular tax, and it is imposed at a 15 per cent rate.6
There are two recognised major weaknesses with the current United
States tax system. The tax laws have undergone frequent and substantial
changes resulting in a very complex set of statutory rules. Not only is the
law complex, but the forms which taxpayers must complete and the
procedures they must follow are also complex. In addition the tax system
is perceived, and probably rightly so, as one which lacks equity, especially
vertical as well as horizontal equity. Such perception strains the effec-
tiveness of the system. In attempting to overcome such weaknesses, one
must question whether the goals of horizontal and vertical equity are
compatible with the goal of simplicity.
UNITED STATES TAX LEGISLATION IN THE 1980s
There have been several major tax acts in the United States in the 1980s.
The first was the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,' under which
the rules related to instalment sales were simplified and the use of such
sales was expanded. In that year Congress also enacted the Bankruptcy
Tax Act of 1980.' That Act essentially changed the rules for tax conse-
quences to the bankrupt taxpayers and for the cancellation of
indebtedness income to taxpayers outside of bankruptcy.
1. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) s.1.
2. IRC s.11.
3. IRC s.1202.
4. IRC s.1201 (a).
5. IRC s.46.
6. See IRC ss.55 and 56, respectively.
7. PL No. 96-471.
8. PL No. 96-589.
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To date, the most significant piece of United States tax legislation in
the 1980s has been the Economic Tax Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(commonly called ERTA).9 That Act was proposed by the Reagan admini-
stration and it applied the 'supply side' or 'trickle down' economic
philosophy. Substantial changes were made under ERTA. The most
significant of those changes was a reduction of all noncorporate tax rates
over a period of years, including a reduction of the maximum rate from
70 per cent to 50 per cent. Additionally, ERTA introduced the concept of
indexing to tax rates, to some deductions such as exemptions and to the
zero bracket amount (the standard deduction). Another significant part
of the Act was the adoption of the accelerated cost recovery system"o
(commonly called ACRS), applying new rules of depreciation with
respect to both personal and real property. Under those rules, the lives of
depreciable property were substantially shortened greatly accelerating
depreciation allowances. In addition, the Act coupled ACRS with an
expansion of the investment credit. The Reagan administration was able
to propel ERTA through Congress with little difficulty. The initiative
with respect to tax legislation in the United States at that point was
clearly with the Reagan administration and not with Congress.
In 1982, Congress adopted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act" whose principal purpose was to raise revenue at a time when the
deficit was beginning to soar. Basically, that legislation retracted some of
the ERTA benefits, especially some benefits of ACRS and the investment
credit. It also made major changes in the area of taxation of deferred
compensation allowing self-employed persons benefits comparable to
those which historically had been allowed to employees. Additionally in
1982, Congress passed the Subchapter S Revision Act." Under Sub-
chapter S, small corporations are allowed to be taxed as non entities, i.e.
similar to partnerships. This Act revised those rules to make the taxation
of such 'S Corporations' even more like the taxation of partnerships.
The final major piece of United States tax legislation thus far in the
1980s was the Tax Reform Act of 1984.11 The purposes behind this Act
were to substantially reduce the budget deficit and to cut down on
various types of tax shelters. This Act provided more equity but added
substantial complexity to the tax system. One of the major parts of the
Act was to provide what are known as 'time value of money'
provisions." Those provisions contain very intricate and complex rules
related to the imputing and timing of the taxation of interest. Another
major part of the Act simplified and clarified the alimony provisions and
treated all inter-spousal transfers as gifts. The Act also imposed further
restrictions on the ACRS depreciation system and the investment credit.
9. PL No. 97-34.
10. IRC s.168.
11. PL No. 97-248.
12. PL No. 97-354.
13. PL No. 98-369.
14. See, for example, IRC ss.1271-1275.
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Additionally the 1984 Act contained numerous other changes, some of
which are in areas currently of interest to Australians. It imposed a new
section taxing below-interest and interest-free loans in many circum-
stances by imputing interest into the transactions and then determining
the appropriate tax consequences for such imputed interest." Addi-
tionally, it also clarified a long standing controversy with respect to the
question of taxation of fringe benefits providing, in essence, that the fair
market value of all fringe benefits would be included in employees' gross
income unless specifically excluded by statute. Some exclusion statutes
had existed prior to the 1984 Act' 6 and for the most part they were
retained but, additionally, another provision was added providing
specific exclusion for various types of fringe benefits." Any fringe
benefits not subject to exclusion under a statute are included as gross
income to employees.
VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFORM
IN THE 1980s
As was pointed out above, the initiative for tax legislation in the United
States in the early 1980s was with the Reagan administration. Never-
theless as the 1980s progressed, there were various proposals for tax
reform made by persons outside the Reagan administration.' Those
proposals can be categorised into three groups, some introduced by
Congressmen and some outside of Congress. None of those proposals
received serious congressional consideration, although some received
substantial media attention and they may have been the stimulant for
subsequent Reagan administration proposals.
The first group of tax reform proposals, made by non-legislators,
were proposals for taxes such as a consumption tax or a value-added tax.
A consumption tax imposes taxation on an annual basis at progressive
rates on cash flow less savings. Its eventual adoption in the United States
is most unlikely. A value-added tax is a hidden sales tax imposed at all
levels of production and distribution. Many European and South
American countries have adopted a value-added tax and although it has
been frequently discussed in the United States, it has never received
serious congressional attention. However, as a result of the Graham-
Rudman amendment, which requires a balanced budget in the United
States by 1991, it is quite possible that Congress may consider imposing a
value-added tax in order to raise the revenue to meet the balanced budget
requirement.
15. IRC s.7872.
16. See, for example, IRC ss.79, 105 and 106.
17. See IRC s.132 excluding a 'no-additional-cost service', 'qualified employee discount',
'working condition fringe', 'deminimis fringe' and 'on premises athletic facility'.
18. These proposals are discussed in more detail in Sweeney, 'Income Tax Reform', (1985)
9 Taxation of Individual 280.
TAX REFORM IN THE US 97
The second group of United States tax reform proposals are propo-
sals made by various Congressmen for a 'flat tax'. A flat tax is one under
which a flat rate of tax is imposed on a tax base substantially broader
than the present base. Under a flat rate tax, base broadening is achieved
by disallowing personal deductions and many business deductions.
Several such proposals have been made in Congress in the 1980s. The
most significant flat tax proposal was made by Representative Crane and
it was for a 10 per cent flat tax. A similar 10 per cent flat tax proposal
was made by Representative Siljander. His philosophy for the proposal
was: 'Why should one render more to Caesar than he renders to God?'"I
In addition, Senator De Concini proposed a 19 per cent flat tax proposal,
allowing more deductions and integrating the noncorporate and income
taxes. There were other flat tax proposals made by Congressmen. While
such proposals generated substantial media hype which created much
public interest, they were never seriously considered in Congress.
The third and most important group of tax reform proposals were
'modified flat tax' proposals which broaden the tax base and apply
progressive rates with fewer brackets and lower rates than current law.
Probably the most significant of those proposals was the Bradley-
Gebhardt 'Fair Tax Act of 1985'. The proposal substantially broadened
the current tax base (although not as broad as flat tax proposals) and
imposed progressive tax rates of 14 per cent, 26 per cent and 30 per cent.
However, under the Bradley-Gebhardt proposal all deductible items were
deductible at only the 14 per cent rate. The second modified flat tax
proposal was the Kemp-Kasten 'Fast Tax' or 'Fair and Simple Tax Act of
1985'. It was similar to the Bradley-Gebhardt proposal and although it
looked like a 25 per cent flat tax, it was effectively a modified flat tax
proposal because of certain benefits at lower income levels and surtaxes
at the upper income levels. Reportedly Representatives Kemp and Kasten
and Senators Bradley and Gebhardt were willing to compromise their
proposals. However, before any such compromise occurred, President
Reagan again seized the tax reform initiative in an action which led to the
current tax reform proposals considered below.
THE CURRENT TAX REFORM PROCESS
In his January 1984 State of the Union Address, President Reagan
regained the initiative for tax reform by asking the Treasury to study the
present United States income tax system. He asked for consideration of
possible additional alternative taxes such as a value-added tax to the
income tax system and for consideration of reform of the income tax
itself. He imposed two provisos on the Treasury study: he wanted it to
occur promptly, by the end of the 1984 calendar year; and he wanted it to
be 'revenue-neutral', generating the same amount of tax revenue as the
current income tax.
19. Id., p.285.
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Treasury One
Pursuant to President Reagan's order, the Treasury unveiled the conclu-
sions of its study in November 1984 in a tax package commonly referred
to as 'Treasury One'. Its stated goals were equity, efficiency, simplicity,
and the stimulation of some specific economic activities. The Treasury
One proposal was less radical that any of the proposals listed above
which preceded it, but was more radical than any of the proposals
discussed below which followed it. Essentially Treasury One proposed
conversion of the current income tax system to a modified flat tax system
similar to the Bradley-Gebhardt and Kemp-Kasten proposals. It called
for both a substantial broadening of the current tax base and a substan-
tial reduction in tax rates thereby satisfying the revenue-neutral
requirement imposed by President Reagan.
Under Treasury One, tax rates on noncorporate taxpayers were
reduced from the current 14 bracket system with a maximum 50 per cent
rate to a three bracket system with 15 per cent, 25 per cent, and 35 per
cent rates. Corporate taxpayers were to be taxed at a flat 33 per cent rate,
down from the current maximum 46 per cent rate. Neither noncorporate
nor corporate taxpayers received preferential treatment for capital gains,
although such gains were to be indexed under a system which taxed
capital gains as ordinary income in a manner very similar to the proposed
Australian capital gains tax.
Treasury One proposed numerous restrictions on current deductions.
It greatly extended the previously shortened lives of depreciable property
under ACRS, thus reducing substantially the accelerated write-off of
depreciable property. It also called for total repeal of the investment
credit. It denied deductibility to entertainment expenses and placed a cap
on the deduction for business meals. However, in a move toward inte-
grating the corporate and noncorporate income taxes, it allowed
corporations a 50 per cent deduction for dividends paid.
Treasury One's restrictions were not limited to business deductions.
It curtailed personal deductions by imposing stringent limitations on the
deductibility of nonbusiness interest expenses other than interest on a
principal residence, on charitable contributions, and on other personal
deductions. It also called for the total disallowance of a deduction for all
nonbusiness state and local taxes.
Somewhat surprisingly as a result of the combination of lower rates
and limitation of deductions, Treasury One was able to simplify the law
by calling for the outright repeal of both the corporate and noncorporate
Minimum Taxes. Treasury One made numerous other proposals, but the
ones set out above are illustrative of the type of changes it proposed.
The Treasury One proposals were the product of the Treasury with
little input from Congress, special interest groups or lobbyists. Those
groups were silent during the formulation of Treasury One, but did not
remain silent when it was announced. Shortly thereafter, partly as a
result of criticisms from such groups, the Reagan administration sent
Treasury One back to the Treasury for reconsideration.
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Treasury Two
The product of that reconsideration was presented in May 1985 in a
revised proposal commonly referred to as 'Treasury Two'. It became the
proposal which was submitted by President Reagan to Congress for their
action. The goals of Treasury Two were expressed in a letter sent from
the President to Congress which accompanied the proposal and which
stated in part:
We face an historic challenge: to change our present tax system into a
model of fairness, simplicity, efficiency, and compassion, to remove the
obstacles to growth and unlock the door to a future of unparalleled
innovation and achievement.
For too long our tax code has been a source of ridicule and resentment,
violating our Nation's most fundamental principle of justice and fair play.
While most Americans labor under excessively high tax rates that
discourage work and cut drastically into savings, many are able to exploit
the tangled mass of loopholes that has grown up around our tax code to
avoid paying their fair share-sometimes to avoid paying any taxes at all.
The American people want change and for very good reason. Our present
tax code is not only unfair, it slows economic growth and job creation, and
hinders technological advancement by interfering with free markets and
diverting productive investment into tax shelters and tax avoidance
schemes. In 1981, we made the first necessary, historic step by cutting tax
rates and opening the way to vibrant economic growth and expanding
opportunity for all Americans. Now is the time to build on our success, to
redesign the basic structure of our tax system in order to discourage non-
productive economic activity, to encourage greater compliance and to
liberate incentives still further.
Accordingly, I hereby submit my proposal to overhaul our tax code based
on the principles of simplicity and fairness, opening the way to a generation
of growth. This is a tax proposal we can be proud of, a proposal that will
help fulfill America's commitment to fairness, hope, and opportunity for
all its citizens . . .
Treasury Two again achieved revenue-neutrality but made some
changes from Treasury One primarily by liberalising some deductions
and restoring the Minimum Tax. It retained the same noncorporate 15
per cent, 25 per cent and 35 per cent rates and the same 33 per cent
maximum corporate rate. However, it restored preferential treatment to
noncorporate and corporate capital gains, taxing only 50 per cent of non-
corporate gains (thus taxing them at a maximum 17.5 per cent rate) and
taxing corporate capital gains at the current 28 per cent maximum rate.
Generally, it retained the Treasury One restrictions on depreciation and
other business expenses and its repeal of the investment credit. It reduced
the Treasury One restrictions on some personal deductions retaining,
however, the disallowance of nonbusiness state and local taxes.
Treasury Two's combination of the retention of capital gain
preferences and leniency with respect to some deductions along with its
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retention of the Treasury One rates required Treasury Two to make some
limitations on prior deductions to generate additional revenue so as to
remain revenue-neutral. As a result, the corporate dividends paid deduc-
tion was reduced to 10 per cent and the Minimum Tax on both
noncorporate and corporate taxpayers was reinstated.
The Treasury Two tax reform proposal was a submitted to Congress
by the Reagan administration in May 1985. Tax legislation in Congress is
sent first to the House of Representatives, specifically to the House Ways
and Means Committee which produces a bill which is then introduced in
the full House. If passed in the House, it is then acted on in the Senate,
initially in the Senate Finance Committee and then in the full Senate.
Discrepancies between the House and the Senate bills are compromised
by a Joint Committee of the House and the Senate. The compromise is
then resubmitted to both the full House and Senate and, if passed, is sent
to the President and becomes law when he signs it. If he vetoes it, his veto
may be overridden by a two thirds vote of both the House and the
Senate.
The House's Tax Reform Bill of 1985
Pursuant to the procedure above, the administration's Treasury Two
proposal was submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee in
May 1985. During the summer and fall of 1985 that Committee ironed
out a bill which varies substantially from the proposals of Treasury Two.
As to several of the proposals it simply retains current law. For the most
part, the House Bill falls roughly midway between Treasury Two and
current law. Again, it is revenue-neutral but, in general, it narrows the
tax base and consequently raises tax rates to achieve revenue neutrality.
The House Bill imposes a maximum 38 per cent noncorporate tax
bracket on top of Treasury One and Two's 15 per cent, 25 per cent, and
35 per cent brackets. It also increases the maximum corporate tax rate
from 33 per cent to 36 per cent. As seen below, this aspect of the House
Bill was not well received by the Reagan administration. The House Bill
also indirectly raises taxes by reducing Treasury Two's preferential treat-
ment of capital gains. Under current law noncorporate capital gains are
allowed a 60 per cent deduction resulting in taxation of only 40 per cent
of such gains at a maximum 20 per cent tax rate. Treasury Two called for
50 per cent inclusion with a maximum 17.5 per cent tax rate. The House
Bill substantially reduces the preference by allowing only a 42 per cent
deduction and thus 58 per cent inclusion of such gains resulting in a
maximum 22 per cent tax rate. Additionally the Bill provides no
preference or indexing for corporate capital gains which are taxed at a
maximum 36 per cent tax rate, compared with a 28 per cent maximum
tax rate under current law and Treasury Two.
The House Bill substantially narrows the tax base by allowing more
lenient deductions than Treasury Two. Some deduction changes provided
in the Treasury Two proposals are retained in the House Bill. For
example, the depreciation deduction lives are kept similar to the Treasury
Two proposals extending the lives of the property essentially to their
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pre-1981 levels. For example under the Bill, real estate is assigned a 30
year life and qualifies only for straight line depreciation, a far cry from
the 15 year life and elective accelerated depreciation allowed by ERTA in
1981. The Bill also repeals the investment credit. Nevertheless, while
some provisions were retained from Treasury Two, the trend of the
House Bill is to liberalise many of the limitations on deductions that had
been imposed in the Treasury proposals. For example, the limitations on
the deductibility of business expenses such as entertainment expenses and
business meals are not nearly as stringent as those proposed by Treasury
Two. The House Bill imposes some limitations on the current deductibility
of such expenses but allows a deduction for 80 per cent of such costs. The
same is true with respect to non-business deductions. While there had
been strict limitations on deductibility of non-business interest deduc-
tions and charitable contributions under Treasury Two and while there
are some limitations making these deductions stricter than under current
law, nevertheless their deductibility is much closer to current law than to
Treasury Two. In addition, the House Bill turned a complete about-face
on the nondeductibility of non-business state and local taxes under
Treasury Two, restoring full deductibility to them as allowed under
current law.
In addition to raising tax rates and decreasing capital gain
preferences, the House Bill makes other changes to Treasury Two in an
effort to generate more revenue. It phases in the 10 per cent dividend
deduction over a 10 year period. It not only retains the Minimum Tax
which was restored by Treasury Two but it gives it a stronger application
in two ways. The House Bill substantially increases the items of tax
preferences which are subjected to the tax and it imposes an alternative
Minimum Tax on both corporate and noncorporate taxpayers at a tax
rate to 25 per cent. 20
One somewhat hidden aspect of the House Bill as well as the Treasury
proposals is that while they are revenue neutral, they do result in a
substantial shift of the tax burden from noncorporate to corporate
taxpayers. This results primarily from changes in the rules related to
business expenses, depreciation deductions, repeal of any preferential
treatment to corporate capital gains, and repeal of the investment credit.
In addition, as among corporations themselves, more of the burden is
shifted to capital intensive corporations than to high technology and
service corporations.
CONCLUSION
When the House Ways and Means Committee Bill was released, Presi-
dent Reagan balked at the Bill saying that if it came to his desk in its
20. The chart in the appendix to this paper provides a comparative analysis of various
aspects of the proposals comparing current law, Treasury One, Treasury Two and the
House Bill. It might well be examined at this point.
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current form he would veto it. He was especially upset about the increase
in the maximum tax rates on noncorporate and corporate taxpayers from
35 per cent to 38 per cent and from 33 per cent to 36 per cent, respectively.
Taking a signal from the President's statement that he would repeal the
Bill, Republican Congressmen along with some Democrats said, in
effect, if he is going to repeal it, let's stop it now. In a rare legislative
move, the House of Representatives surprised everyone, including the
President, by voting not to allow the House Ways and Means Committee
Bill to move to a vote in the House itself.
At that point, President Reagan reconsidered his statement,
re-examined the entire tax reform legislative process and called in the
Republican Congressmen. In essence, he said that even though this Bill
was not to his liking and he would veto it if it came to his desk in its
current form, nevertheless he felt that the process of tax reform was
extremely vital to the country. He stated that he hoped that the
Republican controlled Senate would come up with a tax bill that would
be much more like Treasury Two, and that when the Joint Committee of
the House and Senate compromised the differences, the Committee
would come up with a proposal that would also be close to Treasury
Two. Consequently, he asked the Republican Congressmen to support
the Bill. In seeking the support of Republican Congressmen, the Presi-
dent is reported to have said that if the bill that came out of the Joint
Committee was identical to the House Bill, he would veto it. As a result
of the President's persuasion, the full House of Representatives adopted
the House Bill on December 17, 1985 by voice vote.
The Senate Finance Committee commenced consideration of a Senate
proposal in March 1986. One can only speculate what will happen to the
Senate proposal. It is an election year in the United States and even
though the Senate is Republican controlled, it is an unpredictable body.
However, it is my opinion that it is more likely than not that the Senate
will pass a tax bill likely late July or early August 1986 and that the
Senate Bill will be similar to the House Bill, although it will fall
somewhere between Treasury Two and the House Bill. A compromise of
the two Bills will likely result in a compromise close but not identical to
the House Bill. This would, of course, give the President a means by
which to sign the Bill and not vary from his original veto threat of the
House Bill. My opinion is that if such tax legislation is enacted, it will be
enacted by October 1986.
Finally, recall the goals of the President in suggesting tax reform in
the United States. They boil down primarily to goals of simplicity and
equity. It is my opinion that the House Bill is somewhat more equitable
than current law and, consequently, one goal is partially achieved.
Nevertheless, the Bill adds much more complexity to the United States
tax system. One can only regret the fact that both goals of simplicity and
equity cannot be achieved by this tax legislation. Perhaps, however, the
two goals are incompatible and can never simultaneously be achieved in
legislation.
TAX REFORM IN THE US
COMPARISON OF SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT LAW,
THE TREASURY ONE PROPOSALS, THE TREASURY TWO PROPOSALS
AND THE HOUSE BILL
Current Law Treasury One Treasury Two House Bill
(1986) (Nov. 1984) (May 1985) (Dec. 1985)
RATES:
Individual 14 rate brackets 3 rate brackets 3 rate brackets 4 rate brackets
from 11 to 50% 15, 25, 35% 15, 25, 35% 15, 25, 35, 38%
Indexed Indexed Indexed Indexed
Corporate Graduated up 33% flate rate Graduated up Graduated up
to 46% to 33% to 36%
Individual 60% excluded; Taxed as 50% excluded; 42% excluded;
Capital so 40% x 50% ordinary so 50% x 35% so 58% x 38%
Gains equals a 20% income but equals a 17.5% equals a 22%
maximum indexed maximum maximum
Corporate 28% maximum No preference 28% maximum No preference
Capital taxed at 33% taxed at 36%
Gains
DEPRECIATION AND INVESTMENT CREDIT:
Depreciation ACRS (6 Economic Indexed, with IDS (10
property classes depreciation investment recovery classes
of 3-19 years) indexed incentive 3-30 years,
indexed)
Investment 6-10% None None None
Credit
VARIOUS PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS:
Personal $1000 and $2000 and $2000 and $2000 and
Exemption indexed for indexed for indexed for indexed for





Zero Generally $3400 Generally $3800 Generally $4000 Generally $4800
Bracket (oint returns) and $2800 and and $2900 and and $2950 and




Interest Fully deductible Fully deductible Same as Similar to
with minor cap with cap on non - Treasury One current law with
on non- principal with a phase-in more stringent
mortgage residence cap
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Current Law Treasury One Treasury Two House Bill
(1986) (Nov. 1984) (May 1985) (Dec. 1985)
State and Deductible Generally not Generally not Deductible
Local Taxes deductible deductible
Charitable Deductible by Deductible Deductible for Deductible for
contributions itemisers and subject to a itenisers, but itemisers,
non-itemisers floor for no deduction deductible in
itemisers but no for non- excess of $100






Entertainment Deductible Not Deductible Not Deductible 80% Deductible
Expenses
Business Deductible Deduction Deduction Deduction
Meals and denied for meal denied for 50% denied for 20%
Travel costs above cap of meal costs of meal costs
Expenses above cap
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX:
Individual 20% Not necessary Retained and Retained and
tightened tightened at a
25% rate
Corporate 15% Not necessary Retained and Retained and
tightened tightened at a
25% rate
